Abstract: This paper investigates the Italian insurance system by analyzing the (interlock) linkages among companies created through their directors. This approach defines interlocking directorates as the tie created between two companies when a person is a member of both boards of directors; each case of administrators' co-presence is thus a connection between companies. The investigation follows a two-step procedure: first, it analyzes the social network of the insurance industry by focusing on the linkages among directors and among companies. Second, network statistics are combined in synthetic indices through principal component analyses in order to verify a correlation between indices and companies' market shares. For the sake of brevity, this analysis is mainly restricted to non-life insurances, which are indeed the least competitive (as claimed 11 companies control the 78% of market) and most closed compared to the competition of other financial agents (life insurances compete with other forms of financial investments).
I. Introduction
An interlocking directorate exists «when one person affiliated with one organization sits on the board of directors of another organization» (Mizruchi, 1996: 271) ; interlocks between firms are called direct interlocks (see also Stokman et al. 1985; Windolf, 2002) . Interlocking directorates occur regularly across industries and have shown to have potential benefits, since they mobilize a scarce resource: the expertise of senior managers and directors of large corporations 1 . However, the plurality and co-occurrence of positions in the company boards is an usual suspect of perfect competition violation and market concentration, especially in the case of direct interlock. Companies wishing to cartelize a market may try to compensate for an absence of trust among independent companies by creating interlocking directorates. By and large, interlocking directorates can create trust at several levels 2 ; they can indeed minimize lack of confidence by putting insiders in places where they can monitor and affect what other companies are doing, e.g. in terms of plans to reduce price, expand capacity or introduce new products. For this, interlocking directorates have played an important role in stabilizing many successful cartels. However, such a system may thus potentially produce economic inefficiencies. Interlocking directorates support cartels to maintain trust by increasing detection and reducing the risk of defection 3 . Dooley (1969) , who provided one of the first academic studies regarding the board interlocks, focuses on the relationship between firms and banks. Dooley found that less solvent firms in the United States are likely to be interlocked with banks. Research on interlocking directorates in North America, Europe and Asia has burgeoned since then and it has been reviewed in Mizruchi and Schwartz (1987) , Morck et al. (1989) , Scott (1991) , Davis & Powell (1992) , Pettigrew (1992) , Berglöf & Perotti (1994) , Hallock (1997) , Hermalin & Weisbach (2001) , Klein (2002) , Fich and White (2005) 4 . Other authors have underlined the interpretation for interlocking directorates as a manner of monitoring, e.g. Stiglitz (1985) , Eisenhardt (1989) . These studies are interesting for perspective in this analysis since they imply that cartel members can use interlocking directorates to monitor activities of other cartel members that could undermine the cartel agreement. 1 For studies that have devoted attention to the possible implications of interlocking directorates, see Eccles (1981) , Mizruchi (1996) , Core at al. (1999) , Heracleous and Murray (2001) , Hermalin & Weisbach (2001) , Fich & White (2005) and references therein. Many economists underline the heuristic value of social network approach, see Jackson (2005) for an excellent survey. Other interesting examples, describing strategic modeling of networks in cooperative and non-cooperative games, learning on networks, networks in labor economics and industrial organization, farsighted formation of networks, are collected in Demange & Wooders (2004) . 2 First, financial interdependence reduces the risk of one partner to betray trust in the other because each partner has a stake in the financial success of the other one. Second, sharing directors creates transparency among cartel participants since each cartel member has an observer in place observing and monitoring activities that could undermine the cartel agreement. 3 For example, the leader of the international uranium cartel, Rio Tinto Zinc (RTZ), controls many of the world's mining movements through an extensive network of interlocking directorates. The diamond cartel continues also to receive much of its stability from a complex network of interlocking directorates. Other important historical examples include the American Tin Plate Company, the National Steel Company, and the American Steel Hoop Company with their significantly overlapping major stockholders and directors. See also Burt (1983) , Mintz & Schwartz (1985) , Eccles & Crane (1988). In the United States, where there is a strong tradition of antitrust policies, 5 the practice of interlocking directorates has been the subject of an intense debate among corporategovernance activists and academics for many decades and it is still debated especially after the recent corporate governance scandals, which have placed the spotlight on directors with multiple board appointments after raising attention on the fact that corporate misdeeds can be traced across directorships (Weil, 2002) . At the turn of the century, it was common for several firms within industries to share directors. The National Bank of Commerce, for example, shared directors with virtually every other major New York bank. Section 8 of the Clayton Act of 1914 expressly prohibited interlocks between firms deemed to be competing in the same markets.
Clayton Act (Section 8) potentially prohibited anti-competitive interlocking directorates among competitors. In particular, it prohibited a person from serving as a director or officer of two or more companies if they are «by virtue of their business and location of operation, competitors, so that the elimination of competition by agreement between them would constitute a violation of any of the antitrust laws». To make up for a lack of trust, companies tried to acquire an ownership stake in fellow cartel members. Again, antitrust law has played a role in limiting this trust-facilitating device. When competitors used cross-ownership to circumvent antitrust policies against price-fixing, Congress responded by proscribing anti-competitive common ownership. Even if the number of interlocks among leading US firms dropped sharply after this point, in 1990 the Interlocking Directorates Act revised in a still more restrictive direction the Clayton Act.
By contrast, in the Italian law system there is no explicit reference to interlocking directorates. They can be considered only indirectly through the norms on the conflict of interests that, in case, can impeach decisions of the board of directors. However, interlocking directorates, when referred to companies in the same sector, are clearly in contrast to article 2390 of the Civil Code, which prevents the co-occurrence of directors in competitive companies.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the Italian sector of insurance business and its reforms. Section 3 describes this work's dataset and methodology. Section 4 reports a descriptive statistics regarding the Italian insurance network. This analysis derives synthetic indices of market concentration by using the principal components technique to reduce the sample variables with a minimum loss of variance. It also compares indices to the market company shares. A final section concludes the analysis.
II. The Italian insurance system
The Italian insurance industry is government-supervised, and insurers must be authorized to do business. The insurance regulatory body is the Istituto per Vigilanza sulle Assicurazioni Private di Interesse Collettivo (the Institute for Control of Private Insurance Companies, ISVAP) even though European Union reporting and other insurance directives are being implemented. A unique and helpful feature of Italian insurance company reports is the inclusion of financial statements of major subsidiary or affiliated companies.
The Italian insurance sector shifted from a strong protectionist context to a "free" market system in 1994. According to the new directives on life and non-life insurance sector, public authorities can no longer control tariffs and insurance policy conditions. The reform seriously affected the non-life insurance business, especially the motor insurance, whose insurance has been compulsory since 1971 -coverage is also required for aircraft, powerboats, hunters, auditors and yachts. The reform introduced a new tariff system based on the «bonus/malus» mechanism and companies started to be free to fix prices according to customers' risk attitudes. The reform aimed to improve the sector efficiency and performance. The implicit ésprit de loi was that a market-oriented sector should be able to provide a better service at a lower cost. In other terms, it supported the invisible hand process's economic perspective that is supposed to achieve the social optimum.
Although Pareto optimality nature of the perfect competition is a milestone for economic theory, its practical implementation is challenging and controversial: the oneto-one correspondence between perfect competition and the Pareto optimum only applies to the case of the perfect competition paradigm. However, real-life markets implement imperfect or monopolistic competition, oligopoly and monopoly. In all these situations, the condition that ensures Pareto optimality under perfect competition, i.e. equality of price and marginal cost, is violated. Moreover, even if competitive markets are considered, invisible hand only applies under the strong assumptions of symmetric information and absence of externalities and transaction costs.
Of course, the 1994 reform represented a step in the direction of a more competitive market structure, but not necessarily a step in the direction of the social optimum, i.e. a Pareto improvement. As the well-known theory of the second best affirms, the central idea of the first theorem of welfare economics is that a competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal. Nevertheless, small divergences from perfect competition lead the system far from the Pareto optimum, and the smaller any divergence is the less we stray from Pareto optimality. In Lipsey and Lancaster's words (1956: 12) «a situation in which more, but not all, of the optimum conditions are fulfilled is necessarily, or is even likely, to be superior to a situation in which fewer are fulfilled.» Many of the perfect competition paradigm assumptions are violated in the insurance market. Hence, the superiority of a free-price system over the public tariff is not guaranteed. First of all, there is a strong problem of asymmetric information between producer and consumer, which has been extensively studied in literature but it is outside the scope of the present paper. Moreover, the market structure is highly non-competitive since the number of insurance companies is often limited.
According to the Italian Association of Insurance Companies (ANIA) Yearbook, 6 about 200 competitors are active in the market; however, the total share of the market of the first eleven is 78% in the non-life business and about 20 companies sum up a share of 70% in the case of life insurances. By analyzing the dynamics of entry-exit in the motor insurance sector, Turchetti & Daraio (2004) have shown that after 1994 the number of authorized insurers clearly fell (23.8% from 1994 to 2000). The downward trend in the number of competitors is particularly significant, as it comes after a period of almost 15 years of constant growth.
A serious signal of market failure associated to the insurance reform is represented by the action of the Italian Antitrust Authority in 2000. Only six years after the deregulation quite a large number of companies have been sanctioned by this authority for violation of the competition discipline with a 361.5 millions of euro total amount of fines.
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A more sounding reference on the impact of this deregulation is the study of Turchetti & Daraio (2004) , which analyze the evolution of the number of motor insurers, their entry-exit dynamics, concentration ratio, the trend of premiums, and their relation to legislative events over the period 1982-2000. This study provides empirical evidence on how deregulation in the insurance sector has shaped market structure and industry performance.
In 2004, the Antitrust Authority fined ANIA. The total amount of fines was 2 million euro. The motivation was that ANIA favored the diffusion of uniform cost parameters for insurance compensations. The Antitrust Authority also obliged the ANIA to interrupt its activity of coordination among insurance companies. In other words, the ANIA was favoring the creation of a cartel among insurance companies by coordinating their price strategies. This highlights another strong violation of the requirements for the free market: agreements between producers are harmful especially if excessive.
This coordination about prices is the most important kind of collusive agreement but it is not the only form for a cartel coordination. For instance, company managers can coordinate their policy through informal talks and, less informally, with more binding actions taken in management meetings in different boards of directors, i.e. when directorates are interlocked. In the rest of the paper we will investigate this possibility.
III. Dataset and methodology
This study investigates interlocking directorates through a dataset built from the 2004 ANIA Yearbook. 8 This approach defines interlocking directorates as the tie created between two companies when a person is member of both boards of directors; each case of administrators' co-presence is thus a connection between insurance companies.
Data about boards of directors has been collected by ANIA directly from insurance companies. The dataset is composed by information on 187 Italian insurance companies operating in Italy on July 10th 2004.
The analysis distinguishes between life and non-life insurance sectors: 99 companies of the dataset belong to the life sector, 102 belong to the non-life sector and 14 companies 7 In the same year, the government froze motor insurance tariffs in order to control price and inflation. The decision was censured by many economists and politicians because of its incompatibility with European laws. 8 The board composition does not reflect the situation at the end of the fiscal year (balance approbation), but the more recent as communicated by the companies. ANIA has taken account of all the Legislative Decrees and ISVAP authorizations until the yearbook publication. The survey does not take account of companies (5 companies Despite the fact that about a hundred competitors are active in the market, the share of the first ten competitors only in the non-life business is 67% (and it becomes 78% for the first eleven competitors and 86% for the first 21 competitors). The market share of the first ten life insurances' competitors if 53% and about 20 companies reach a 70% share.
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The investigation follows a two-step procedure. First, it analyzes the social network of the insurance sector by focusing on the linkages among directors and among companies through the graph theory approach. Then it provides statistics describing the insurance network. Second, network statistics are aggregated in synthetic indices through principal component analysis; indices are then interpreted and the correlation of these indices with the market shares is verified. The following part of this sub-section contains a discussion of this data organization and illustrates the two approaches.
In order to create a network from affiliation data, routines in Ucinet VI converts an m´n matrix (incidence matrix) to an m´m or n´n (adjacence matrix). In this case, each element of the incidence matrix describes the relation between a director (rows) and an insurance company (columns). The incidence matrix is binary (0; 1): one indicates that the director is member of the company's board of directors. Three adjacence matrices have been considered: one for the whole sector, the second one for the life insurance companies and the third for the non-life companies.
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Basic statistics are computed on adjacency matrices. The scheme analyses the adjacency matrices of directors and companies for the whole insurance sector, non-life business, and life business for six social networks. Then it analyses the network of (1) insurance company, (2) directors, (3) life sector companies, (4) life sector directors, (5) non-life sector companies, (6) non-life sector directors. Notwithstanding this interest in the nonlife sector only, the analysis includes all the networks. There are two reasons for this choice. First, all these aggregations contribute to shape a general form for the insurance sector. Second, two non-life sector companies can be indirectly connected trough a common director in a life sector company and viceversa. On these six networks we compute 13 statistics described in box 1. In order to investigate the possible violation of the competitive market assumption, the analysis focuses on the adjacency matrix (social network) of companies and it includes the whole sector to capture also the indirect links discussed above. The standard representation of ties and vertices gives a visual description of this network. Then this analysis focuses on every single network's company in order to examine the variables indicated by the following box. The variables listed above serve the purpose of this analysis; two of the most relevant conceptual dimensions of the inter-organizational ties among companies have been investigated: a) centrality in proximity (i.e. local centrality) and b) network centrality (i.e. computed on the network overall). The former is defined by centrality indices computed on short paths, and it stresses the relevance of close connections. The latter is defined by centrality indices computed on long distance paths, and emphasizes the role played by indirect connections.
The variables related to centrality in proximity are: degree, size, ties, pairs, broker, ego betweeness, cliques, and distance 1-3. Overall network centrality is measured by the following statistics: social distance from 4 to 8 degree, betweeness (standard) and betweeness (strong ties). In this case, distance 2-4 can be referred to both centrality dimensions.
Variables described in box 2 are used here to derive synthetic indices of network properties starting from the principal component analysis. The underlying idea of the principle component analysis is to reduce the dimensionality of a dataset that may contain correlated variables by retaining its variability as much as possible. Formally, principal component analysis searches for a few uncorrelated linear combinations (principal components) of the original variables that capture most of the information in the original variables.
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In the bi-dimensional case, it is possible to summarize the correlation between two variables by a scatter plot and a regression line. The regression line represents the best summary of the linear relationship between the variables. If a variable approximating the regression line could be defined, that variable would capture most of the essence of the two original variables, i.e. the dataset. The subjects' single scores on that new factor, represented by the regression line, could then be used in future data analyses to represent that essence belonging to the two items. This approach transforms the two variables into one factor or component -the factor is a vector made up of two numbers that can be conceived as weights of the former variables. The new factor is a linear combination of the two variables and its significance increases in the two-variable correlation.
The example described above, which combines two correlated variables into one factor, illustrates the basic idea of the principal components analysis. Extending the twovariables example to multiple variables, then the computations become more involved, but it is based on the same basic principle of expressing multiple variables with a single factor. By considering more than two variables, it is possible to think of them as defining a space, just as two spatial variables define a plane. Thus, having three variables, it is possible to draw a three-dimensional scatter plot, and data fit into a plane (two orthogonal lines individuate a plane). In the principal componen s t analysis, after e first factor has been extracted, e. g. after the first line has been drawn from the data, defining another line that best fits the remaining variability, and onsecutive factors are extracted and represented.
. Non-centered principal components analysis implies an all-zero point ector) of reference: no interlock linkages. By contrast, centering on, or normalizing by, some variables shift the reference points to a hypothetical average stand. The director network is made up of 246 nodes, which represent members present in more than one board of directors. The director network system is characterized by a strong connection for interlocking, structured around a main component that collects average degree life business (network 5); also networks 2, 4 and 6 do not differ much in their features.
The insurance company adjacency matrix (life and non-life sector) is made up of 187 vertices. There are no 187 isolated enterprises in competition between them but there are 51 components; the main component has 109 vertices. 63 cliques have been found. Every enterprise is connected with others by 9.626 degrees (in this case degree is represented by a director who sits on the board of two or more companies); the total sum of the degrees is equal to 1800. In a full competitive system the interlocking directorates: thus, sum degree, degree and cliques would be equal to zero.
According to this relational perspective an index of competitiveness is derived from the fragmentation level of the system, i.e. the proportion of number of components on the total number of vertex. In a competitive environment the number of components is normally equal to the number of nodes since all the companies are iso fr depends on the num about half of nodes of the reticulum. There are 99 triads of cliques. The connection for a node is 14.138.
The competitiveness gap associated with the company network is 73%. The gap measures the distance between the competitive case and the actual value of fragmentation. Disaggregating the sector, the gap becomes 66% in life business sector and 62% in the non-life business sector. This means that indirect links across companies of the non-life sector created by companies in the life business are relevant. The director networks are also associated with competitiveness gaps, they are computed in a similar manner, and the gaps in the director networks have a similar pattern.
14 This investigation focus on the company network (network number 1 in table 1) to highlight the direct and indirect relations among companies. Although it focuses on the non-life sector, it considers that two companies operating in the non-life sector can be also connected by an indirect link through a common director in a life sector company. A visual representation of the company network is provided in figure 2. Table 2 -PCA variable loadings The principal component analysis thus individuates three indices of centrality that can be interpreted as follow.
In the first index all variables enter with a positive weight and almost in a uniform manner. The variance of weights of the first component is low (i.e. 0.002, whereas the variance of other components weights is about 0.062). Therefore, the first component can be considered as an index of the (potential) collusiveness by tacit agreements, since all the variables are measures of distortions in the ideal view of agents independence (as said, perfect competition requires that all of them are equal to zero). The first ten companies in the collusiveness index 18 are Europ Assistance; Assicurazioni Generali; Systema; Assitalia; SARA; Dialogo Assicurazioni; Nuova Tirrena; Compagnia di Assicurazione di Milano; Genertel; and Risparmio Assicurazioni. These companies constitue 9% of the firms operating in the sector, but they have a 30% of the total market share.
In the second index, variable weights are more volatile. The company's score is high if broker, ego-bet and betweeness are high; by contrast it is low for high value of distances 6-8. Hence, a company will have a high score if it is in the center of the ego-network, without long connections and where alters are not connected one with the other directly. The index measures the crucial centrality of the company in a concentrated ego-network since alters can be connected only by the ego. We have discussed the concentration of the directors in the boards. This is an im the the lack of agreement among comp interlocking directorates are not of concern per se, as their me taken neither as a proof of an active relation nor as an abuse of ma rs of potential power relationships between comp at directors exploit networks of board memberships me potential exists. In this section we will further investigate this point.
easure of a possible relation is correlation; arket share are positive (0.407, 0.1988, and 0.167, respectively) . ual relation between the social concentra are (vertical axis). More in detail, compa so shares reported in vertical axis. Interlocking concentration is strictly related to market concentration as figure 4 visually depicts.
Interlocking directors seem to be used by insurance companies to support a large cartel that dominates the market. Cartels stability is assured by the trust generated by the interlocking directorates. Placing a director on a cartel partner's board, each cartel member has an observer in place who can monitor activities such as plans to reduce price, expand capacity, or introduce new products that could undermine the cartel agreement (notice that price policy is not the only policy that a cartel may aim to set in a cooperative manner, see Motta et al., 2005) . Interlocking directorates can help minimize trust problems by putting insiders in places where they can both monitor and affect what other companies are doing.
V. Concluding remarks
The Italian insurance industry is characterized by a high degree of concentration and, therefore, by a low degree of competition. This paper supports the idea that concentration is due to a violation of a basic competitive markets assumption, namely the absence of tacit agreements. It also suggests that insurance companies collude in an institutionalized manner: collusive agreements are not the result of collusive formal or informal activities between agents but they are the result of a social institutionalized system of interlocking directorates. Results contrast a large part of empirical evidences, which on the contrary underline that indirect interlocks are typically not a factor in competition policy since they are mainly common between financial and non-financial companies. Thus, in Italy the interlocking directors seem to be the instrument used by insurance cartel to maintain its stability 20 . Cartels are inherently unstable and problems of cartel stability are related to trust; for a cartel to be formed each participant must trust its cartel partners not to cheat on the agreement, e.g. by charging less than the fixed price.
By considering the insurances social network, the analysis derived some indices of terlocking-directors concentration and compared them with the company market ares; this analysis pointed out a non-competition system. Companies in line with the erfect competition paradigm are 18%, but their market share is only about 0.02%. By contrast, 30% of the market is shared by a strongly interconnected small group of firms, which represents only the 9% of the number of firms in industry.
The policy implications of this analysis are simple. As pointed out by Adam Smith: «People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices. It is impossible indeed to prevent such meetings, by any law which either could be executed, or would be consistent with liberty and justice. But though the law cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less to render them necessary.» 21 Therefore, since direct interlock is a way to link together "people of the same trade" and there is the evidence that this "assembling together" affects the market shares and sector competitiveness, direct interlocking directorates have to be forbid, as in the United States. Moreover, indirect interlocking linkages by companies operating in the lifebusiness sector seem to be relevant to reduce the market degree of competitiveness; this analysis suggests that indirect interlocking linkages have also to be regulated, in particular, interlocking directorates that indirectly link competitors should be sanctioned. 
